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Abstract. The purpose of this article is to present a parametrised functional inter-
pretation. Depending on the choice of the parameter relations one obtains well-known
functional interpretations, such as Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation, Diller-Nahm’s vari-
ant of the Dialectica interpretation, Kohlenbach’s monotone interpretations, Kreisel’s
modified realizability and Stein’s family of functional interpretations. A functional in-
terpretation consists of a formula translation and a proof translation. We show that all
these interpretation only differ on two choices: firstly, on “how much” of the counter-
examples for A became witnesses for ¬A when defining the formula translation, and,
secondly, “how much” of the witnesses of A one is interested in when defining the proof
translation.
Keywords. Functional interpretations, Dialectica interpretation, modified realizability,
monotone functional interpretations, majorizability, proof mining.
1 Introduction
In [1] Go¨del developed his Dialectica interpretation (also known as functional interpretation)
with the goal of proving relative consistency of first-order arithmetic. The consistency of arith-
metic was reduced to that of a quantifier-free calculus based on the language of finite types.
He successfully showed that quantifier dependencies can be totally captured by functional de-
pendency, so that logic is eliminated in favour of objects of higher types. Around the same
time, Kreisel observed that such proof techniques give in fact much more than just relative
conservation results. In the process of replacing logic by functionals, the interpretation au-
tomatically makes explicit information “hidden” in the logical structure of the proof. In [2]
Kreisel then gives a clear presentation of Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation and uses it to define
the constructive truth of mathematical theorems.
In the same paper Kreisel also sketches an “alternative interpretation”, which was further
developed in [3] and came to be called modified realizability. Kreisel observes that those proof
interpretations can be used for proving independence results, and the different versions of the
interpretation might provide independence proofs for different principles.
It is normally held that one of the weakenings of Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation is that
it assumes decidability of prime formulas, known as the contraction problem. This happens
because when interpreting e.g. A → A ∧ A the Dialectica interpretation must, in loose terms,
pick one counter-example out of two, which can be done by checking which one is indeed a
counter-example. It might as well be that both are indeed counter-examples, which implies that
the choice at this point is not unique, making the Dialectica interpretation non-canonical (cf. [4],
section 2.3.1). A variant of the Dialectica interpretation in which this problem is circumvented
was then suggested in [5], and is known as the Diller-Nahm variant of Dialectica interpretation.
The trick was simply to collect all such counter-examples, postponing the actual decision. In
[6] Stein showed that this idea could be generalised, and he defines a family of interpretation,
parametrised by the type level from which the counter-examples are collected.
In [7], Kohlenbach observed that Howard’s majorizability relation [8] can be used to define
a “monotone” version of the Dialectica interpretation, where majorants, rather than precise
witnesses, are obtained from proof. This allows for new (even ineffective) principles to be
interpreted, and for a new solution to the contraction problem.
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The goal of this article is to show that all these functional interpretation can be viewed as
special cases of a single parametrised interpretation via a careful instantiation of two parameter
relations. We are able to prove a single soundness theorem, stating sufficient conditions on the
parameter relation for such soundness theorem to hold. We also characterise the interpretation
via parametrised logical principle.
1.1 Heyting arithmetic in all finite types
The set of finite types T is inductively defined as follows:
ρ, σ :≡ o | ρ→ σ | ρ× σ | ρ∗.
The language of ILω contains variables for all finite types, and constants serving as constructors
and destructors on the non-basic types, e.g. two families, for each type σ, len(·) : σ∗ → o and
(·)(·) : σ∗ × o→ σ for the length and lookup of finite sequences of type σ∗ (respectively). The
atomic formulas are simply equalities of basic type s = t and ⊥. Formulas are built out of
atomic formulas via the logical constructions ∧,∨,→ and quantifiers ∀xσ and ∃xσ. Negation
is defined as ¬A ≡ A →⊥. As for the logical rules, we have chosen to work with a natural
deduction system (as shown in Appendix A) for two reasons. Firstly, this will give a better
understanding of how each logical construct influences on the interpretation. Secondly, natural
deduction systems have not been widely used in the context of proof interpretations, and we
try to contra-balance this here.
Heyting arithmetic in all finite types HAω is an extension of ILω with constants for zero,
successor, higher-order recursion, together with the appropriate quantifier-free axioms, and
the induction rule:
A(0) A(n)→ A(n+ 1)
IND
A(n)
Without loss of generality we can assume that the subproofs of A(0) and A(n)→ A(n+ 1) do
not contain undischarged assumptions.
We will assume that higher type equality in HAω is treated neutrally, as defined in [9]. This
means that only equality between objects of basic type is part of the language, and only
universal axioms are used. In the soundness proofs, however, we will make use of the rule of
extensionality, as used by Spector [10], which should therefore be added to the verifying system.
2 Functional Interpretations
Let Tω be an extension of the quantifier-free fragment of HAω. A functional interpretation of
HAω into Tω consists of two mappings. One formula translation
A 7→ |A|xy ,
where x and y are two (possibly empty) disjoint sequences of free-variables of the resulting
formula; and a proof translation (also called soundness)
HAω ` A 7→ Tω ` B,
for some formula B such that HAω ` B → ∃x∀y|A|xy . We will call standard soundness the proof
translation in which B is the formula ∀y|A|ty, for some term t.
The sequence of variables x marks the computational information required by the formula,
or the constructive content of A. The substitution of a term t for such variable, i.e. |A|xy [t/x] will
be denoted by |A|tx. We will call any term t for which ∀y|A|ty holds a witness for A. Moreover,
the type of x, which we shall denote by τA, we call the type of the formula A. The sequence of
variables y marks the position of the possible counter-examples for concrete potential witnesses
t. Hence, in order to show that t is not a witness for A we just need to produce a sequence of
terms s such that ¬|A|ts.
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Therefore, the proof translation component of the interpretation gives a way of translating
a proof of A into a proof of some formula B which implies the existence of witnesses for A. We
want proof interpretations which are also complete in the sense that the existence of witnesses
for A also implies back the truth of A, i.e. ∃x∀y|A|xy → A in some reasonable model.
The goal of this article is to show that both formula and proof translations can be parametrised,
so that instantiations of those parameters will give rise to most of the known functional inter-
pretations. We will start with a parametrisation of the formula translation, and we show that
a standard soundness, i.e. proof mapping, can be given by assuming some simple properties
of the parameter. We then introduce a second parameter in the proof translation, and show
that further restrictions on the second parameter allow us to prove the parametrised proof
translation for the parametrised formula translation.
3 Parametrised Formula Translation
We will give an interpretation of HAω into a theory Tω, which contains an uninterpreted
bounded universal quantifier ∀x < tA(x). This should be viewed as an abbreviation rather than
as new formula construct, and the symbol < is merely part of the abbreviation. As we will see,
the bounded quantification ∀x < tA(x) will allow us to parametrise the amount of counter-
example that becomes witness when interpreting negation (or more generally, when interpreting
the premise of an implication). More clearly, we should answer the following question: given the
interpretation |A|xy of a formula A, what should the interpretation of ¬A be? The Dialectica
interpretation’s approach is to say that the witnesses of ¬A are functionals which take potential
witnesses for A and turn them into counter-example of those potential witnesses, i.e. an f
satisfying ¬|A|xfx is a witness for ¬A. The counter-examples of ¬A are just the real witnesses
of A. So,
|¬A|fx :≡ ¬|A|xfx.
We can take a less radical position and say that f does not produce counter-examples for A,
but just gives a “bound” on those, i.e.
|¬A|fx :≡ ¬(∀y < fx|A|xy).
By choosing ∀x < tA(x) to be an abbreviation for A(t) we get back Go¨del’s interpretation
of negation |¬A|fx :≡ ¬|A|xfx. On the other hand, if we take ∀x < tA(x) to be an abbrevia-
tion for ∀xA(x) instead we have that |¬A|fx :≡ ¬∀y|A|xy , meaning that any term is a witness
for a negated statement, provided that ¬∀y|A|xy holds, for all x. This corresponds to the ap-
proach taken by modified realizability, which says negated formulas do not ask for any specific
witnesses. We will show that with some basic assumptions on the choice of the abbreviation
∀x < tA(x) we can define a parametrised interpretation and prove a general soundness theorem.
This implies that instantiations of the abbreviation which satisfy the required assumptions will
give rise to different functional interpretations.
Before listing our assumptions on what ∀x < tA(x) can be an abbreviation for, let us define
the class of formulas which will be the image of the parametrised formula translation, i.e. for
all formulas A, the formula |A| will be in this class.
Definition 1. Let the abbreviation ∀x < tA(x) be fixed. The class of <-bounded formulas (we
denote arbitrary formulas in this class by Ab and Bb) are those built out of prime formulas
via conjunction (Ab ∧ Bb), implication (Ab → Bb) and premise-bounded implication (∀x <
tAb(x)→ Bb).
Definition 2 (Parametrised Formula Translation). To each formula A we associate a
<-bounded formula |A|xy as follows.
|Aat| :≡ Aat, when Aat is an atomic formula.
That is to say, for atomic formulas the tuples of witnesses and counter-examples are both
empty. Assume we have already defined |A|xy and |B|vw, we define
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|A ∧B|x,vy,w :≡ |A|xy ∧ |B|vw,
|A ∨B|x,v,ny,w :≡ (n = 0→ |A|xy) ∧ (n 6= 0→ |B|vw),
|A→ B|g,fx,w :≡ ∀y < gxw |A|xy → |B|fxw ,
|∀zρA(z)|fy,z :≡ |A(z)|fzy ,
|∃zρA(z)|x,zy :≡ |A(z)|xy .
Recall that x, y, v, w, f and g are sequences of variables. Therefore, if y is the empty sequence
we let |A→ B|fx,w :≡ |A|x → |B|fxw .
We will make use of the following three condition on the choice of what ∀x < tA(x) can be
an abbreviation for. Let Tω be an extension1 of HAω. For all formulas Γ,A and B (with free
variables a) and closed terms p, q, r0, r1, s, t there must exist closed terms a1, a2 and a3 such
that
(A1) Tω ` |Γ → Γ |a1a,λl.ll,u ,
(A2) if Tω ` |Γ ∧ Γ → A|r0a,r1a,tal0,l1,y then Tω ` |Γ → A|
a2a,λl.tall
l,y .
(A3) if Tω ` |Γ → (A ∧ (A→ B))|pa,sa,qa,tal,y,x,w then Tω ` |Γ → B|a3a,(ta)◦(sa)l,w .
Intuitively, a1alu produces a bound for u; a2aly provides a common bound for r0aly and r1aly;
and a3alw gives a bound on the potentially infinite set
{w : w < paly(sal)w ∧ y < qal(sal)w}.
It is clear that condition (A3) supersides (A2) when <-bounded quantifiers (i.e. ∀x < tA(x))
can be used to represent standard numeric bounded quantifier (i.e. ∀n ≤ tA(n)). As we will
see, however, this is not the case e.g. with the Dialectica interpretation.
We present now a standard proof translation for the parametrised formula translation. This
should be viewed as a preparation for the next step: a parametrisation of the proof translation.
The following theorem will be shown to be a special case of the parametrised proof translation.
Theorem 1 (Standard Soundness). Assume Tω is an extension of HAω for which the (A)
conditions hold. If
HAω + {Γ} ` A,
then there are sequences of closed terms t and r of appropriate types such that
Tω ` ∀a, v, y |Γ → A|ra,tav,y ,
where a is the tuple of free-variables of Γ and A.
Proof. See Appendix B.
2
The notation {Γ} is used in order to distinguish axioms of the theory HAω from implicative
assumptions Γ , which are considered undischarged assumptions. The functional interpretation
will provide witnesses for the conclusion and “potential” counter-examples for these assump-
tions. Of course, one could also view the axioms of HAω as undischarged assumption, in which
case potential counter-example for the axioms will also be provided.
3.1 Characterisation
We show now that the following principles are sufficient for proving the equivalence between
the truth of A and the existence of witnesses for A. Markov principle for <-bounded formulas
MP< : (∀xAb(x)→ Bb)→ ∃b(∀x < bAb(x)→ Bb),
the schema of choice
1 For simplicity we will not go into the details of how much arithmetic the verifying system Tω should
contain. It will be clear, however, that for the results presented here Tω could also be a subsystem
of HAω.
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AC : ∀x∃yA(x, y)→ ∃f∀xA(x, fx)
and independence of premise for ∀ <-bounded formulas
IP< : (∀xAb(x)→ ∃yB(y))→ ∃y(∀xAb(x)→ B(y)).
Theorem 2. For any formula A in the language of HAω
HAω +MP< + AC+ IP< ` A↔ ∃x∀y|A|xy .
Proof. By induction on the logical structure of A. The only non-trivial case is when A has the
form A→ B, in which case we have:
A→ B IH⇐⇒ ∃x∀y|A|xy → ∃v∀w|B|vw
IL⇐⇒ ∀x(∀y|A|xy → ∃v∀w|B|vw)
IP<⇐⇒ ∀x∃v(∀y|A|xy → ∀w|B|vw)
IL⇐⇒ ∀x∃v∀w(∀y|A|xy → |B|vw)
MP<⇐⇒ ∀x∃v∀w∃b(∀y < b|A|xy → |B|vw)
AC⇐⇒ ∃f, g∀x,w(∀y < gxw|A|xy → |B|fxw )
Def⇐⇒ ∃f, g∀x,w|A→ B|f,gx,w. 2
4 Instantiations of ∀x < aA(x)
We show next that by simply instantiating the parameter relation < in the unifying functional
interpretation we obtain well-known functional interpretations, both the formula translation
and the corresponding standard soundness theorem. In each case we explicitly give the families
of terms a1, a2 and a3 and show that conditions (A1), (A2) and (A3) hold for such choices.
4.1 Kreisel’s modified realizability
Modified realizability is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Modified realizability [2, 3]). For each formula A of HAω we associate a
new formula x mr A (x is a sequence of fresh variable) inductively as follows:
x mr Aat :≡ Aat, when Aat is an atomic formula.
Assume we have already defined x mr A and v mr B, we define
x, y mr A ∧B :≡ x mr A ∧ v mr B,
x, v, n mr A ∨B :≡ (n = 0→ x mr A) ∧ (n 6= 0→ v mr B),
f mr A→ B :≡ ∀x(x mr A→ fx mr B),
f mr ∀zA(z) :≡ ∀z(fz mr A(z))
x, z mr ∃zA(z) :≡ x mr A(z).
In order to obtain modified realizability from the unifying functional interpretation we take
∀x <r aA(x) to mean ∀xA(x). In such case, the definition of implication
|A→ B|f,gx,w :≡ ∀y <r gxw |A|xy → |B|fxw ,
given in Definition 2 when instantiated becomes
|A→ B|fx,w :≡ ∀y |A|xy → |B|fxw .
Notice that conditions (A1), (A2) and (A3) clearly hold for such choice, no matter what terms
a1, a2 and a3 one chooses.
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Theorem 3. In the Definition 2, let ∀x <r aA(x) be an abbreviation for ∀xA(x). Then for all
formulas A in the language of HAω
HAω ` x mr A↔ ∀y|A|xy .
Proof. By induction on the logical structure of A. The case in which A is atomic is trivial. For
the composite cases, assume x mr A↔ ∀y|A|xy and v mr B ↔ ∀w|A|vw.
x, v mr A ∧B ≡ x mr A ∧ v mr B
↔ ∀y|A|xy ∧ ∀w|B|vw
↔ ∀y, w(|A|xy ∧ |B|vw)
≡ ∀y, w|A ∧B|x,vy,w
x, v, n mr A ∨B ≡ (n = 0→ x mr A) ∧ (n 6= 0→ v mr B)
↔ (n = 0→ ∀y|A|xy) ∧ (n 6= 0→ ∀w|B|vw)
↔ ∀y, w((n = 0→ |A|xy) ∧ (n 6= 0→ |B|vw))
≡ ∀y, w|A ∨B|x,v,ny,w
f mr A→ B ≡ ∀x(x mr A→ fx mr B)
↔ ∀x(∀y|A|xy → ∀w|B|fxw )
↔ ∀x,w(∀y |A|xy → |B|fxw )
≡ ∀x,w|A→ B|fx,w
f mr ∀zA(z) ≡ ∀z(fz mr A(z))
↔ ∀z(∀y|A(z)|fzy )
≡ ∀z, y|∀zA(z)|fz,y
x, z mr ∃zA(z) ≡ x mr A(z)
↔ ∀y|A(z)|xy
≡ ∀y|∃zA(z)|x,zy
4.2 Go¨del’s functional interpretation
Go¨del’s functional interpretation (also known as the Dialectica interpretation) is normally
defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Dialectica interpretation [1, 11]). For each formula A of HAω we associate
a new formula AD of the form ∀x∃yAD, where AD is quantifier-free, inductively as follows:
(Aat)D :≡ Aat, when Aat is an atomic formula.
Assume we have AD ≡ ∃x∀yAD(x, y) and BD ≡ ∃v∀wBD(v, w), we define
(A ∧B)D :≡ ∃x, v∀y, w(AD(x, y) ∧BD(v, w)),
(A ∨B)D :≡ ∃n, x, v∀y, w(n = 0→ AD(x, y) ∧ n 6= 0→ BD(v, w)),
(A→ B)D :≡ ∃f, g∀x,w(AD(x, gxw)→ BD(fx,w)),
(∀zA(z))D :≡ ∃f∀z, wAD(fz, x, z)
(∃zA(z))D :≡ ∃z, x∀yAD(x, y, z).
In each case it is hopefully clear what the quantifier-free formula (·)D is. E.g. In the case
of disjunction we have (A ∨B)D ≡ (n = 0→ AD(x, y)) ∧ (n 6= 0→ BD(v, w)).
In order to obtain Go¨del’s original functional interpretation from the unifying functional
interpretation we take ∀x <g tA(x) to mean A(t). In such case, the definition of implication
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|A→ B|f,gx,w :≡ ∀y < gxw |A|xy → |B|fxw ,
can again on the meta-level be simplified to
|A→ B|fx,w :≡ |A|xgxw → |B|fxw ,
and that is what we use in the following.
Condition (A1) holds by taking a1alu := u. The fact that condition (A2) holds now is not as
trivial as in the case of modified realizability. Notice that it is enough to produce a term a2
satisfying
|Γ |la2aly → |Γ |lr0aly ∧ |Γ |lr1aly.
This can be achieved e.g. if for each formula Γ one can produce a term tΓ satisfying
Tω ` |Γ (a)|lu ↔ tΓalu = 0.
If this is the case the we can define a2 as
a2aly :=
{
r0aly if tΓal(r0aly) 6= 0
r1aly otherwise.
As for condition (A3), we simply take a3alw := pal(qal(sal)w)(sal)w. It is easy to see that if
|Γ |lpalyxw → (|A|saly ∧ (|A|xqalxw → |B|talxw ))
holds then, by taking x := sal and y := qal(sal)w, we get
|Γ |lpal(qal(sal)w)(sal)w → |B|tal(sal)w
i.e. |Γ → B|a3a,(ta)◦(sa)l,w .
Theorem 4. In the Definition 2, let ∀x <g aA(x) be an abbreviation for A(a). Then for all
formulas A in the language of HAω
HAω ` AD(x, y)↔ |A|xy .
Proof.With the simplification outlined above for the case of implication, one can immediately
see that the definition of AD(x, y) coincedes precisely with the definition of |A|xy . 2
4.3 Diller-Nahm functional interpretation
The Diller-Nahm interpretation is normally presented as a variant of Go¨del’s Dialectica inter-
pretation where decidability of prime formulas is no longer necessary. The drawback is that
instead of producing witnessing terms given a proof of A the Diller-Nahm interpretation only
produces a finite collection of candidate witnesses, with the assurance that one of those is
indeed a witness.
Definition 5 (Diller-Nahm interpretation [5]). For each formula A of HAω we associate
a new formula A∧ of the form ∀x∃yA∧, where A∧ is 0-bounded – i.e. contains only bounded
numerical quantifiers, inductively as follows:
(Aat)∧ :≡ Aat, when Aat is atomic formula.
Assume we have A∧ ≡ ∃x∀yA∧(x, y) and B∧ ≡ ∃v∀wB∧(v, w), we define
(A ∧B)∧ :≡ ∃x, v∀y, w(A∧(x, y) ∧B∧(v, w)),
(A ∨B)∧ :≡ ∃n, x, v∀y, w((n = 0→ A∧(x, y)) ∧ (n 6= 0→ B∧(v, w))),
(A→ B)∧ :≡ ∃f, b, g(·)∀x,w(∀n ≤ bxwA∧(x, gnxw)→ B∧(fx,w)),
(∀zA(z))∧ :≡ ∃f∀z, wA∧(fz, x, z),
(∃zA(z))∧ :≡ ∃z, x∀yA∧(x, y, z).
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The only difference to Go¨del’s original functional interpretation is in the treatment of
implication. The functional b and the sequence of functionals g(·) are a convenient way to
quantify over finite multi-sets. For simplicity we abbreviate e.g. ∃bo∃go→τ(·) ∀n ≤ bA(gn) by the
use of finite sequence as ∃gτ∗∀y ∈ gA(y). Using this shorthand the treatment of implication
can be rewritten as
(A→ B)∧ :≡ ∃f, g∀x,w(∀y ∈ gxwA∧(x, y)→ B∧(fx,w)).
Therefore, the Diller-Nahm interpretation can be viewed as an instantiation of the unifying
functional interpretation where ∀xτ <∧ tτ∗A(x) is an abbreviation for ∀x ∈ tA(x).
The term a1 in condition (A1) can be taken to be a functional which produces a singleton tuple
out of a given parameter, i.e. a1alu := 〈u〉. In order to satisfy condition (A2) we need terms a2
computing the union of two finite multi-sets, which is simply the concatenation of two finite
sequences. As for condition (A3), the term a3alw can be taken to be the union of the finite
multi-sets paly(sal)w, for each y ∈ qal(sal)w, where qal(sal)w are also finite multi-sets.
4.4 Stein’s family of interpretations
In [6], a family of interpretation between Diller-Nahm and modified realizability was defined,
parametrised by a number n > 0. The parameter n basically dictates the types of the universal
quantifiers which are left “untouched” by the interpretations, as done in the definition of
modified realizability. Universal quantifiers of type level bigger than n will get pulled out from
premises of implications, following the idea of Diller and Nahm interpretation.
The interpretation we define below is basically Stein’s definition, in the sense that for each
formula A, our definition of An is intuitionistically (but not syntactically) equivalent to his
definition.
For the rest of this section we use the following notations: given a tuple of variable x, we
will denote by x the sub-tuple containing the variables in x which have type level ≥ n, whereas
x denotes the sub-tuple of the variables in x which have type level < n. The actual value of n
will be clear from the context.
Definition 6 (Stein’s family of f.i.’s [6]). For each positive natural number n, the interpre-
tation of a formula A of HAω is a new formula An of the form ∃x∀y∀yAn, where An contains
only universal quantifiers of type level < n, and no existential quantifier. The assignment is
done inductively as follows:
(Aat)n :≡ Aat, when Aat is an atomic formula.
Assume we have An ≡ ∃x∀y∀yAn(x, y) and Bn ≡ ∃v∀w∀wBn(v, w), we define
(A ∧B)n :≡ ∃x, v∀y, w∀y, w(An(x, y) ∧Bn(v, w)),
(A ∨B)n :≡ ∃m,x, v∀y, w∀y, w((m = 0→ An(x, y)) ∧ (m 6= 0→ Bn(v, w))),
(A→ B)n :≡ ∃f, g∀x,w∀x,w(∀in−1∀yAn(x, gxwi, y)→ Bn(fx,w)),
(∀zA(z))n :≡ ∃f∀z, y∀z, yAn(fz, y, z),
(∃zA(z))n :≡ ∃z, x∀y∀yAn(x, y, z).
This interpretation can be viewed as a generalization of Diller and Nahm’s idea of collecting
witnesses into finite sequences. In the case of Stein’s family of interpretations, one actually
collects families of witnesses, where the indexing i of the family ranges over the pure type
(n − 1). Therefore, in the treatment of implication, the resulting value of gxw is actually a
function of type (n− 1)→ τ . For the sake of simplicity and intuition we write quantifications
of the form ∀in−1An(x, gxwi) as ∀y ∈ img(gxw)An(x, y). We can then more clearly write the
treatment of implication as
(A→ B)n :≡ ∃f, g∀x,w∀x,w(∀y ∈ img(gxw)∀yAn(x, y)→ Bn(fx,w)),
We show now that also Stein’s family of interpretations can be obtained via the unifying
functional interpretation by defining the following abbreviation
∀xτ <nτ g(n−1)→τA(x) :≡
{∀xA(x) if level(τ) < n
∀x ∈ img(g)A(x) otherwise.
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It is again easy to see that this choice complies with conditions (A1) and (A2), all we need is
a surjective functional i 7→ i0 × i1 of type (n− 1)→ (n− 1)× (n− 1). In the case of condition
(A3) it is sufficient to produce a term a3 satisfying
∀yσ < a3hzA(y)→ ∀xτ < z∀yσ < hxA(y).
The only non-trivial situation is when σ ≥ n and τ < n, i.e.
∀yσ ∈ a3hzA(y)→ ∀x∀yσ ∈ hxA(y),
which stands for (z is not used)
∀in−1A(a3hi)→ ∀x<n∀jn−1A(hxj).
We can then take a3hi := hi0i1 using again any surjective functional i 7→ i0 × i1.
Theorem 5. In the Definition 2, let ∀x <nτ aA(x) be an abbreviation as described above. Then
for all formulas A (let An ≡ ∃x∀y∀yAn(x, y)) in the language of HAω
HAω ` An(x, y)↔ |A|xy .
Proof. We only present here the case of implication. Assume An ≡ ∃x∀y∀yAn(x, y) and
Bn ≡ ∃v∀w∀wBn(v, w). Then
(A→ B)n(f, g, x, w) ≡ ∀in−1∀yAn(x, gxwi, y)→ Bn(fx,w)
≡ ∀y ∈ img(gxw)∀yAn(x, y)→ Bn(fx,w)
≡ ∀y <n gxwAn(x, y)→ Bn(fx,w)
IH↔ ∀y <n gxw|A|xy → |B|fxw
≡ |A→ B|f,gx,w. 2
5 Parametrised Proof Translation
We describe now how the Soundness Theorem (Theorem 1) can also be generalised, via a second
family of parameter relations ≺. This gives rise to a family of soundness theorems for a family
of functional interpretations. We will again only use the relation in the context ∃x ≺ aA(x), so
that ≺ does not need to be a relational symbol in the language. We will assume, however, that
the abbreviation ∃x ≺ tA(x) must “behave” as an existential quantifier, in the following sense
(E1) For all formulas A(x), B(y) and C(x, y), and terms t, s, if
• Tω ` ∃x ≺ tA(x),
• Tω ` ∃y ≺ sB(y), and
• Tω +A(x) +B(y) ` C(x, y)
then Tω ` ∃x ≺ t, y ≺ sC(x, y).
For instance, we can choose ∃x ≺ aA(x) to mean A(a). In fact, this instantiation will give
us back Theorem 1 as a special case of our parametrised soundness theorem. We will show,
however, that ∃x ≺ tA(x) can also be taken to be ∃x(x ≤∗ t∧A(x)), where ≤∗ is Howard’s ma-
jorizability relation (see [8]). This was first observed in [7], and gives rise to so-called monotone
versions of the Dialectica interpretation and modified realizability. As we will see, according to
the framework set up in Section 2, these monotone variants are a combination of the standard
formula translations with a monotone proof translation.
Besides condition (E1), we will assume also the following on the choice of the abbreviation
∃x ≺ tA(x):
(E2) For each formula A, closed term s and term t[f ], if
Tω ` ∃f ≺ s∀a, y|A|t[f ]ay
then there exists a closed term t∗ such that
Tω ` ∃F ≺ t∗∀a, y|A|Fay .
We call t∗ a ≺-majorizing term for t. In particular, when the tuple f is empty we have
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Tω ` ∀a, y|A|tay ⇒ Tω ` ∃f ≺ t∗∀a, y|A|fay
We will also consider bounded versions of the conditions (A1), (A2) and (A3). For all formulas
Γ,A,B and C, and closed terms r0, r1, s, t, p, q there are closed terms a∗1, a
∗
2, a
∗
3 such that
(A1)∗ Tω ` ∃ν ≺ a∗1∀a, l, u|Γ → Γ |νa,λl.ll,u ,
(A2)∗ if
Tω ` ∃g0 ≺ r0, g1 ≺ r1, f ≺ t ∀a, l0, l1, y|Γ ∧ Γ → A|g0a,g1a,fal0,l1,y
then
Tω ` ∃χ ≺ a∗2∃f ≺ t∗∀a, l, y|Γ → A|χa,fal,y ,
where t∗ is the majorizing term for λa, l.tall.
(A3)∗ if
Tω ` ∃g ≺ p, f ≺ s, h ≺ q, j ≺ t∀l, y, x, w|Γ → (A ∧ (A→ B))|ga,fa,ha,jal,y,x,w
then
Tω ` ∃ξ ≺ a3, f ≺ s, j ≺ t∀l, w|Γ → B|ξa,(ja)◦(fa)l,w .
We show that such weakenings together with the two (E) conditions are sufficient for proving
the following parametrised version of the Soundness Theorem.
Theorem 6 (Parametrised Soundness). Assume Tω is an extension of HAω for which the
(A)∗ and (E) conditions hold. If
HAω + {Γ} ` A,
then there are sequences of closed terms t∗ and r∗ of appropriate types such that
Tω ` ∃g ≺ r∗∃f ≺ t∗∀a, v, y |Γ → A|ga,fav,y ,
where a is a tuple of free-variables of Γ and A. Recall that we use {Γ} to indicate that the
assumptions Γ are being viewed as undischarged assumptions, rather than axioms of the theory,
which (could be, but) are not (in general) witnessed.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Notice that the parametrised soundness gives a family of soundness theorems (depending on
the choice of ∃x ≺ aA(x)) for the parametrised formula translation (which is parametrised by
∀x < aA(x)). Moreover, observe that in the monotone soundness we do not require terms a1, a2
and a3 to be part of the language, but only majorizing terms a∗1, a
∗
2 and a
∗
3 for those, according
to the choice for ∃x ≺ aA(x).
5.1 Instantiating the parametrised soundness
Table 1 summarises how different instantiations of ∀x < tA(x) and ∃x ≺ tA(x) give rise to
different functional interpretations.
∀xρ < aA(x) ∃x ≺ aA(x) Formulas + proof translation
A(a) A(a) Dialectica interpretation
∀i ≤ |a|A(ai) A(a) Diller-Nahm variant of Dialectica
∀in−1A(ai) orρ≥n ∀xA(x) A(a) Stein’s family of interpretations
∀xA(x) A(a) Modified realizability
A(a) ∃x ≤∗ aA(x) Monotone Dialectica interpretation
∀i ≤ |a|A(ai) ∃x ≤∗ aA(x) no given name
∀in−1A(ai) orρ≥n ∀xA(x) ∃x ≤∗ aA(x) no given name
∀xA(x) ∃x ≤∗ aA(x) Monotone realizability
Table 1. Instantiations of the parametrised functional interpretation
For instance, instantiating < with <g and ≺ with ≤∗ gives the so-calledmonotone Dialectica
interpretation, whereas taking < to be <r gives the monotone realizability interpretation (cf.
[7]). In the first case, we no longer need characteristic terms a2 for deciding prime formulas, but
only a majorant a∗2 for those, which can be taken to be the constant 1 functional. Moreover,
as shown in [7], ineffective principles such as weak Ko¨nig’s lemma, which are not interpretable
with the standard soundness theorem, become interpretable under the monotone soundness.
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6 Programs from Proofs
One should notice that the parametrised functional interpretation can be applied directly to
analyse proofs, leaving the instantiation to a later stage, once the (parametrised) witnessing
term and (parametrised) verifying proof have been obtained. This can be achieved by adding
to the language new formulas constructs ∀x < tA(x) and ∃x < tA(x), families of constants
a∗1, a
∗
2, a
∗
3 and axiom schemes corresponding to the conditions (A) and (E).
Starting with a proof of A what one obtains is then a proof of ∃f ≺ t∀a, y|A|fay , for some
closed term t. The extracted term t will potentially contain the new constants added, and the
proof of |A|ty will potentially make use of the new formula constructs. Extracting the “abstract”
witnessing term t allows for a comparison between the terms extracted via different functional
interpretation, namely, we know that terms extracted via different interpretations will have
the same structure, and will only differ on the choices of a∗1, a
∗
2 and a
∗
3. This will be clear cut
when analysing proofs of theorem whose interpretation do not contain <, e.g. implication-free
theorems and theorems in prenex form. For such formulas A the interpretation |A|xy will be
syntactically the same, no matter what the choice of the abbreviation ∀x < tA(x), although
the extracted term t and the proof of ∃f ≺ t∀a, y|A|xy will possibly change.
6.1 Dealing with classical proofs
The difference between the interpretation becomes evident when e.g. dealing with classical
logic. After applying the negative translation (for elimination of classical logic) to proofs of
theorems ∀x∃yAqf(x, y) one gets a proof of ∀x¬¬∃yAqf(x, y), which is a shorthand for
∀x((∃yAqf(x, y)→⊥)→⊥)).
Via the parametrised f.i. applied to a proof of such theorem one obtains a term t and a proof
of
∃f ≺ t∀x¬∀y < fx¬Aqf(x, y).
If we instantiate the parametrised interpretation with the Dialectica abbreviation ∀x <g tA(x)
we get that t is actually a bound (in the sense of ≺) on the witnessing function for the original
theorem. Moreover, if ∃x ≺ sA(x) is chosen to mean A(s), then t is the actual witnessing
function for the theorem.
Similarly, instantiating with the Diller-Nahm abbreviation we would get a function which for
any x produces a finite tuple of possible witnesses for y. In the case of Stein’s abbreviation,
e.g. with n bigger than the type level of y, the term t would produce a family (indexed by the
pure type n− 1) of possible witnesses for y.
Applying modified realizability directly would simply produce a new proof of ∀x¬¬∃yAqf(x, y),
without any extra information on the witnessing function. In such cases we can make use of the
A-translation, which transforms proofs of ∀x¬¬∃yAqf(x, y) into proofs of ∀x∃yAqf(x, y) before
modified realizability is used.
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Appendix A: Logical rules
The logical framework we use is intuitionistic predicate logic in the language of finite types, on
top of which we build HAω. We have opted for the following natural deduction formalism:
{A}α
⊥ ⊥ E
A
A0 A1 ∧I
A0 ∧A1
A0 ∧A1 ∧E
Ai
Ai ∨I
A0 ∨A1 A0 ∨A1
[A0]α0···
B
[A1]α1···
B ∨Eα0,α1
B
[A]α···
B → Iα
A→ B
A A→ B → E
B
A(xσ) ∀I∀xσA(x)
∀xσA(x) ∀E
A(sσ)
A(sσ) ∃I∃xσA(x) ∃xσA(x)
[A(x)]α···
B ∃Eα
B
In the rule ∀I the variable x must not occur free in (non-discharged) assumptions of the
derivation, whereas in the rule ∃E, x must not occur free in assumptions on which B depends,
except for A(x). Furthermore ∃E has the restriction that x is not free in B.
We are using the convention that undischarged assumptions are marked by {·}. This is
changed into [·] when the assumptions are discharged. Except in the proofs of Theorems 1 and
6 we do not explicitly show undischarged assumptions.
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Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
As stated in the theorem, let us assume for simplicity that a is a tuple of variables containing
all the free-variables of Γ , A and B. Also for simplicity we assume that Γ is a single formula,
which might be used multiple times in the derivation of A. In the following we indicate how a
proof pi : (Γ ` A) can be transformed into a proof p˜i of |Γ → A|ra,tav,y , for closed terms r and t,
by induction on the structure of pi. During the translation, rules of pi might get translated into
derivable rules in the derivation p˜i.
Assume Γ,A and B have interpretations |Γ |lu, |A|xy and |B|vw, respectively.
Axioms. All the axioms of HAω are universal, i.e. of the form ∀nAqf(n), so that |∀nAqf(n)|n ≡
Aqf(n). To each of those we associate the proof
∀nAqf(n) ∀E|∀nAqf(n)|n
i.e. the axioms of HAω imply their interpretation.
Assumption. To each undischarged assumption {Γ} we associate a derivation of |Γ → Γ |a1a,λl.ll,u ,
which is assumed to exist by condition (A1).
Falsity elimination. Consider an arbitrary instance
{Γ}α··· pi⊥⊥ E
A
of this rule. By induction hypothesis we have a derivation p˜i of |Γ →⊥|ral , for some closed term
r. We can then easily derive |Γ → A|r′a,0l,y , where 0 is the zero functional of appropriate type
and r′aly := ral. In the following we will omit the definition of the primed terms when those
are simple projections, as it is the case in r′.
Conjunction introduction. Assume for simplicity that both branches use the same undischarged
assumption Γ .
{Γ}α··· pi0
A0
{Γ}α··· pi1
A1 ∧I
A0 ∧A1
By induction hypothesis we have derivations of
(i) |Γ → A0|q0a,t0al0,y0
(ii) |Γ → A1|q1a,t1al1,y1
for some closed terms q0, q1, t0, t1. From (i) and (ii) we can build a derivation of
|Γ ∧ Γ → A0 ∧A1|q
′
0a,q
′
1a,t
′
0a,t
′
1a
l′0,l
′
1,y0,y1
,
where q′0, q
′
1, t
′
0, t
′
1, l
′
0 and l
′
1 are appropriate projections. By condition (A2) we have the existence
of a closed term a2 and a derivation of
|Γ → A0 ∧A1|a2a,λl.t
′
0all,λl.t
′
1all
l,y0,y1
.
Conjunction elimination. By induction hypothesis we have closed terms q, t0 and t1 and a proof
of
|Γ → A1 ∧A2|qa,t0a,t1av,y0,y1 .
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This easily gives a derivation of |Γ → A0|qa,t0av,y0 , where q′avy0 := qavy00 (y1 is substituted by
the constant 0 of appropriate type).
Implication introduction. This is immediately treated by the induction hypothesis.
Implication elimination. Let us look at the following instance of this rule
{Γ}α··· pi1
A
{Γ}α··· pi2
A→ B → E
B
By induction hypothesis we have closed terms p1, p2, q, s and t and derivations for
(i) |Γ → A|p1a,sal1,y
(ii) |Γ → (A→ B)|p2a,qa,tal2,x,w .
From those we can derive
|(Γ ∧ Γ )→ (A ∧ (A→ B))|p1a,p2a,sa,qa,tal1,l2,y,x,w
By condition (A2) we get
|Γ → (A ∧ (A→ B))|a2a,λl.sall,λl.qall,λl.talll,y,x,w
Finally, by condition (A3) we have a closed term a3 and a proof of
|Γ → B|a3a,(λl.tall)◦(λl.sall)l,w .
Universal introduction and elimination. Let us look at the following instance of the rule
{Γ}α··· pi
A(z) ∀I∀zA(z)
By induction hypothesis we have closed terms r and t and a derivation of
|Γ → A(z)|raz,tazl,y .
This can be simply viewed as a derivation of |Γ → ∀zA(z)|ra,tal,y,z . Similarly with the universal
elimination.
Disjunction introduction. Assume we have a derivation of |Γ → A0|qa,t0al,y0 . We can then obtain
a derivation of |Γ → A0 ∨A1|qa,t0a,0,0l,y0,y1 , where 0 is the zero functional of appropriate type, and
y1 is a fresh variable. Similarly with the case Γ ` A1.
Disjunction elimination. Let us consider now the rule
{Γ}β··· pi2
A0 ∨A1
[A0]α0··· pi0
B
[A1]α1··· pi1
B ∨Eα0,α1
B
Instead of applying the induction hypothesis to the two derivations pi0 : (A0 ` B) and pi1 :
(A1 ` B) we will consider a slight extensions of those, namely
{n = 0}α0 {n = 0→ A0}β0 → E
A0··· pi0,e
B
{n 6= 0}α1 {n 6= 0→ A1}β1 → E
A1··· pi1,e
B
Applying the IH to these extended derivations will give us tuples of closed terms q0, q1, s0 and
s1 and derivations of
16 P. Oliva
(i) (n = 0)→ |(n = 0→ A0)→ B|q0an,s0anx0,w
(ii) (n 6= 0)→ |(n 6= 0→ A1)→ B|q1an,s1anx1,w
By the decidability of equality of basic type we get
|((n = 0→ A0) ∧ (n 6= 0→ A1))→ B|q0an,q1an,cond(n,s0an,s1an)x0,x1,w ,
i.e.
|A0 ∨A1 → B|q0a,q1a,λn.cond(n,s0a,s1a)x0,x1,n,w .
More generally, if Γ had been used in the sub-proofs pi0 and pi1 then we would actually have
|Γ → (A0 ∨A1 → B)|p0a,q0a,q1a,λn.cond(n,s0a,s1a)x0,x1,n,w .
Again by IH, the derivation pi2 is transformed into a proof of
|Γ → A0 ∨A1|p1a,t0a,t1a,tal,y0,y1 ,
for some closed terms p1, t0, t1 and t. By conditions (A2) and (A3) (similarly to the treatment
of →E) we get
|Γ → B|a3a,cond(λl.tall,(λl.s0all)◦(λl.t0all),(λl.s1all)◦(λl.t1all))l,w
Existential introduction. Let us consider the following instance of the rule
{Γ}α··· pi
A(s) ∃I∃zA(z)
By induction hypothesis we get closed terms q and t and a proof of
|Γ → A(s)|qa,tal,y ,
which can be viewed as a proof of |Γ → ∃zA(z)|qa,ta,sl,y .
Existential elimination. Consider the rule
{Γ}α··· pi0
∃zA(z)
{Γ}α, [A(z)]β··· pi1
B ∃Eβ
B
By induction hypothesis we get derivations of
(i) |Γ → A(ral)|q0a,sal0,y
(ii) |Γ → (A(z)→ B)|q1,paz,tazl1,x,w
Let z := ral in (ii). By conditions (A2) and (A3) we get |Γ → B|a3a,(ta(ral))◦(sa)l,w .
Induction rule. Recall that we might assume that the subproofs in the induction rule do not
contain undischarged assumptions. Assume we have already analysed the two subproofs ob-
taining
∅··· p˜i0
|A(0)|sy ∀I∀y|A(0)|R(s,t,0)y
∅··· p˜i1
∀y′ < q[x, y]|A(n)|xy′ → |A(n+ 1)|txy ∀I∀y(∀y′ < q[x, y]|A(n)|xy′ → |A(n+ 1)|txy )
∀x(∀y|A(n)|xy → ∀y|A(n+ 1)|txy )
∀y|A(n)|R(s,t,n)y → ∀y|A(n+ 1)|R(s,t,n+1)y
IND∀y|A(n)|R(s,t,n)y ∀E|A(n)|R(s,t,n)y
having that R(s, t, 0) = s and R(s, t, n+ 1) = tR(s, t, n). Here we have used on more condition
on the abbreviation ∀y < q A(y), namely that ∀yA(y)→ ∀y < q A(y). 2
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Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 6
The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of the proof HAω + {Γ} ` A. We will use
most of the notation introduced in Appendix B.
Axioms. All the axioms of HAω are universal, i.e. of the form ∀nAqf(n), so that nothing needs
to be done. i.e. the axioms of HAω imply their interpretation.
Assumption. Let us consider first the case of an undischarged assumption Γ . By assumption
(A1)∗ we have
∃ν ≺ a∗1∀a, l, u|Γ → Γ |νa,λl.ll,u .
Let t := λa, l.l. By (E2) we then get
∃ν ≺ a∗1, f ≺ t∗∀a, l, u|Γ → Γ |νa,fal,u ,
which is the derivation in the new proof associated with the undischarged assumption Γ in the
original proof.
Falsity elimination. Consider an arbitrary instance
{Γ}α··· pi⊥⊥ E
A
of this rule. By induction hypothesis we have a derivation p˜i of
∃g ≺ r∀a, l|Γ →⊥|gal ,
for some closed term r. By the assumption (E1) we can derive ∃g ≺ r∀a, l|Γ → A|t[g]a,sal,y , where
s := λa.0 (the zero functional of appropriate type) and t[f ] := λa, l, y.fal. By (E2) we get
∃g ≺ t∗, f ≺ s∗∀a, l, y|Γ → A|ha,fal,y .
Conjunction introduction. In this case
{Γ}α··· pi0
A0
{Γ}α··· pi1
A1 ∧I
A0 ∧A1
by induction hypothesis we have closed terms t0, t1, q0 and q1 such that
∃f0 ≺ t0, g0 ≺ q0∀a, l0, y0|Γ → A0|g0a,f0al0,y0
∃f1 ≺ t1, g1 ≺ q1∀a, l1, y1|Γ → A1|g1a,f1al1,y1 .
By (E1), from these we can derive
∃f0 ≺ t0, f1 ≺ t1, g0 ≺ q0, g1 ≺ q1∀a, l0, l1, y0, y1|Γ ∧ Γ → A0 ∧A1|g0a,g1a,f0a,f1al0,l1,y0,y1 .
By (A2)∗ we have
∃χ ≺ a2, f0 ≺ t∗0, f1 ≺ t∗1∀a, l, y0, y1|Γ → A0 ∧A1|χa,f0a,f1al,y0,y1 ,
where t∗i majorizes λl.tll.
Conjunction elimination. By induction hypothesis we have closed terms q, t0 and t1 and a proof
of
∃g ≺ q, f0 ≺ t0, f1 ≺ t1∀a, v, y0, y1|Γ → A1 ∧A2|ga,f0a,f1av,y0,y1 .
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By (E1), this gives a derivation of ∃g ≺ q′, fi ≺ ti∀a, v, yi|Γ → Ai|ga,fiav,yi , for i ∈ {0, 1}, where
q′ is an appropriate projection of q.
Implication introduction. This is immediately treated by the induction hypothesis.
Implication elimination. Let us consider the implication elimination
{Γ}α··· pi
A A→ B → E
B
assuming for simplicity that only the derivation of A has assumptions (otherwise (E2)∗ must
also be used). By induction hypothesis we have
∃g ≺ p, f ≺ s∀a, l, y|Γ → A|ga,fal,y
∃h ≺ q, j ≺ t∀a, x, u|A→ B|ha,jax,u
which by (E1) gives
∃g ≺ p, f ≺ s, h ≺ q, j ≺ t∀a, l, y, x, u|Γ → (A ∧ (A→ B))|ga,fa,ha,jal,y,x,u .
Applying condition (A3)∗ we get
∃ξ ≺ a3, f ≺ s, j ≺ t∀a, l, u|Γ → B|a3a,(ja)◦(fa)l,u .
Finally, by (E2) we obtain
∃ξ ≺ a3, f ≺ r∗∀a, l, u|Γ → B|a3a,fal,u .
where r[j, f ] := λa.(ja) ◦ (fa).
Universal introduction and elimination. Let us look at the following instance of the rule
{Γ}α··· pi
A(z) ∀I∀zA(z)
By induction hypothesis we have closed terms r and t and a derivation of
∃g ≺ r, f ≺ t∀a, z, l, y|Γ → A(z)|gaz,fazl,y .
This can be simply viewed as a derivation of
∃g ≺ r, f ≺ t∀a, z, l, y|Γ → ∀zA(z)|ga,fal,y,z .
Similarly with the universal elimination.
Disjunction introduction. Assume we have a derivation of
∃g ≺ q, f0 ≺ t0∀a, l, y0|Γ → A0|ga,f0al,y0 .
By (E1) we can then obtain a derivation of
∃g ≺ q, f0 ≺ t0∀a, l, y0, y1|Γ → A0 ∨A1|ga,f0a,0,0l,y0,y1 ,
where 0 is the zero functional of appropriate type, and y1 is a fresh variable. By (E2) this gives
∃g ≺ q, f0 ≺ t0, f1 ≺ t1, k ≺ s∀a, l, y0, y1|Γ → A0 ∨A1|ga,f0a,f1a,kal,y0,y1 ,
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Similarly with the case Γ ` A1.
Disjunction elimination. Let us consider now the rule
{Γ}β··· pi2
A0 ∨A1
[A0]α0··· pi0
B
[A1]α1··· pi1
B ∨Eα0,α1
B
Applying the IH we get tuples of closed terms r0, r1, p0, p1, terms s0, s1 and the derivations of
(i) ∃g0 ≺ q0, f0 ≺ s0∀a, x0, w|A0 → B|g0a,f0ax0,w
(ii) ∃g1 ≺ q1, f1 ≺ s1∀a, x1, w|A1 → B|g1a,f1ax1,w
By the decidability of equality of basic type and assumption (E1) we get{∃g0 ≺ q0, g1 ≺ q1, f0 ≺ s0, f1 ≺ s1∀a, x0, x1, n, w
|((n = 0→ A0) ∧ (n 6= 0→ A1))→ B|g0a,g1a,λn.cond(n,f0a,f1a)x0,x1,n,w ,
i.e.
∃g0 ≺ q0, g1 ≺ q1, f0 ≺ s0, f1 ≺ s1∀a, x0, x1, n, w|A0 ∨A1 → B|g0a,g1a,λn.cond(n,f0a,f1a)x0,x1,n,w .
Again by IH, the derivation pi2 is transformed into a proof of
∃h ≺ p, j0 ≺ t0, j1 ≺ t1, j ≺ t∀a, l, y0, y1|Γ → A0 ∨A1|ha,j0a,j1a,jal,y0,y1 ,
for some closed terms p, t0, t1 and t. Finally, by conditions (E1), (E2) and (A3)∗ we get
∃ξ ≺ a∗3, f ≺ r∗∀a, l, w|Γ → B|ξa,fal,w ,
where r[f0, f1, j0, j1, j] := λa.cond(ja, (f0a) ◦ (j0a), (f1a) ◦ (j1a)).
Existential introduction. Let us consider the following instance of the rule
{Γ}α··· pi
A(s[a])∃I∃zA(z)
By induction hypothesis we get closed terms q and t and a proof of
∃g ≺ q, f ≺ t∀a, l, y|Γ → A(s[a])|ga,fal,y ,
which can be viewed as a proof of ∃g ≺ q, f ≺ t∀a, l, y|Γ → ∃zA(z)|qa,ta,(λa.s[a])al,y . By (E2) we
have a closed term s∗ and a proof of
∃g ≺ q, f ≺ t, h ≺ s∗∀a, l, y|Γ → ∃zA(z)|qa,ta,hal,y .
Existential elimination. Consider the rule
{Γ}α··· pi0
∃zA(z)
[A(z)]β··· pi1
B ∃Eβ
B
By induction hypothesis we get derivations of
(i) ∃g ≺ q, f ≺ s∀a, l, y|Γ → A(ral)|ga,fal,y
(ii) ∃h ≺ p, j ≺ t∀a, x, w|A(z)→ B|haz,jazx,w
Let z := ral in (ii). By conditions (E1), (E2) and (A3)∗ we get
∃g ≺ a∗3, f ≺ t∗∀a, l, w|Γ → B|a
∗
3a,fa
l,w .
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Induction rule. We assume to have already analysed the two subproofs of the induction rule,
obtaining
(i) ∃f ≺ s∀a, y|A(0)|fay
(ii) ∃g ≺ q, h ≺ t∀a, n, x, y|A(n)→ A(n+ 1)|ga,tax,y .
By condition (E1), from (ii) we get
∃h ≺ t∀a, n, x(∀y|A(n)|xy → ∀y|A(n+ 1)|hxy ),
which gives
∃f ≺ s, h ≺ t∀a, n(∀y|A(0)|R(f,h,0)ay ∧ (∀y|A(n)|R(f,h,n)ay → ∀y|A(n+ 1)|R(f,h,n+1)ay )).
By induction (again using condition (E1)) we get
∃f ≺ s, h ≺ t∀a, n, y|A(n)|R(f,h,n)ay ,
which by condition (E2) implies
∃f ≺ r∗∀a, n, y|A(n)|fay ,
where r[f, h] := λn.R(f, h, n). Here we have again used one more condition on the abbreviation
∀y < q A(y), namely that ∀yA(y)→ ∀y < q A(y). 2
